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I. INTRODUCTION
Senator Ernest Hollings once described automated calls as “[t]he scourge
of modern civilization. They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our
dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until
we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall.”1 With advances in
technology and the increased popularity of cellphones and smartphones, the
frequency of these disturbances has only increased.2 Automated callers, or
“autodialers,” can now call and text cellphone users anywhere at any time,
reaching them outside of the home, at work, on their morning commute, on
a date, or even in a quiet theater. The growing popularity of cellphones has
coincided with an increasing rate of phone number reassignments. Good
faith autodialers now find themselves calling a phone number’s previous,
consenting owner only to reach the phone number’s new, unconsenting
owner.3 In response, courts have struggled to determine when the law
prohibits autodialers from making such calls to a phone number’s new
owner.4
1. 137 CONG. REC. 30,821 (1991) (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings).
2. See ERNEST HOLLINGS, AUTOMATED TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,

S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 2 (1991) (finding that calls were made to “more than 7 million
Americans every day” in 1991); TNS Report: Americans Now Receive 300 Million
Unwanted Robocalls Per Day, BUSINESSWIRE (Mar. 4, 2020, 9:03 AM), https://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200304005116/en/TNS-Report-Americans-Now
-Receive-300-Million-Unwanted-Robocalls-Per-Day (citing 2020 TNS ROBOCALL
INVESTIGATION REPORT) (stating that in 2019, Americans received almost 300 million
unconsented calls per day).
3. See William Dolan et al., FCC Establishes Reassigned Phone Number Database,
JONES DAY (Jan. 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/01/fcc-establishesreassigned-phone-number-database (explaining that 35 million phone numbers are
reassigned yearly in the United States); Tim Bauer, JPMorgan Chase to Pay $3.75
Million to Settle TCPA Suit on Calls to Reassigned Phone Numbers, INSIDEARM (June
27, 2016, 7:35 AM), https://www.insidearm.com/news/00041956-jp-morgan-chase-topay-375-million-to-set/ (reporting that JPMorgan Chase called 675,000 reassigned
phone numbers and had to pay an almost $4 million settlement).
4. See, e.g., Medley v. Dish Network, LLC, 958 F.3d 1063, 1069–70 (11th Cir.
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The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”)’s autodialing ban
generally restricts a business or other commercial entity from using an
automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), to make unconsented calls or
texts.5 Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227,
requires that any call from an ATDS must have the prior express consent of
the phone number’s owner.6 While the TCPA expressly provides that phone
number owners must consent to receive calls from autodialers, it does not
explicitly address whether phone number owners can revoke their consent.7
However, as the TCPA’s implementing agency, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) interprets the TCPA to allow for
revocation “at any time and through any reasonable means.”8 Courts have
upheld this FCC interpretation as permissible.9 Furthermore, some courts
take this interpretation a step further, holding that consent given as part of a
bargained-for exchange cannot be unilaterally revoked.10
When a phone number owner who previously gave consent as part of a
bargained-for exchange discontinues ownership over the phone number, the
wireless carrier may subsequently reassign the phone number.11 The caller
may be unaware of the change in ownership. However, the TCPA still
allocates the burden of ensuring proper consent to the caller.12
2020) (holding that consent cannot be unilaterally revoked in a bargained-for exchange);
Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1255 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that
consent is revocable under the TCPA). See generally Zachary D. Miller et al., Effective
Revocation of Consent Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act Following Reyes
v. Lincoln Automotive Financial Services, 72 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 453 (2018)
(stating that there should be a special interpretation of consent in TCPA context because
of the statute’s remedial purpose for consumers who receive unwanted calls).
5. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)–(b).
6. Id. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); see also id. § 227(b)(1)(B) (listing a few enumerated
exceptions to the consent requirement, including in the case of an emergency).
7. See id. § 227 (failing to create revocation of consent provisions).
8. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30
FCC Rcd. 7961, 7990 (2015) (establishing that regardless of how consent was given, the
caller carries the burden of proving that it has the required prior express consent).
9. See, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th
Cir. 2017) (concluding that revocation “must be clearly made and express a desire not to
be called or texted”).
10. See generally Medley v. Dish Network, LLC, 958 F.3d. 1063 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that when consent is given as part of a bargained-for exchange, common law
contract principles prevent one party from unilaterally revoking consent); Reyes v.
Lincoln Auto. Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that where consent is not
freely given, but is part of a contract’s consideration, that consent cannot be unilaterally
revoked).
11. See Dolan et al., supra note 3.
12. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30
FCC Rcd. at 7990, 7994.
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When a caller previously obtained proper consent from a wireless phone
number’s previous owner, and the phone number is later reassigned to a new
owner, courts should apply the common law of consent to determine whether
the reassignment effectively revokes the previous owner’s consent. The
TCPA requires the caller obtain the current phone number owner’s prior
express consent before making automated calls, however new owners of
reassigned numbers were not privy to the previous owner’s bargained-for
consent with the caller.13 Thus, autodialers cannot secure the requisite priorexpress consent.14 Accordingly, callers should face TCPA liability when
calling reassigned phone numbers because of the burden of proof and
Congress’s intent to protect private phone number holders from automated
calls when it passed the TCPA.15
This Comment will first explore the purpose of the TCPA and the role of
the FCC in implementing the law, the TCPA’s consent requirement and the
inferred revocation of consent procedure, and the permissibility and
applicability of common law doctrines to federal law. It will then analyze
whether courts should apply contractual consent law and the TCPA’s text to
establish a standard for consent revocation in the case of reassigned phone
numbers. Finally, this Comment will argue that courts must apply common
law consent principles to disputes over calls made to reassigned phone
numbers when the previous owner gave consent to be contacted and suggest
that the FCC continue its efforts to implement the Reassigned Number
Database to ease the burden on callers of confirming consent.
II. THE TCPA’S CONSENT REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM
AUTOMATED CALLS AND THE SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES OF
REASSIGNED PHONE NUMBERS
Congress passed the TCPA to curb the increasing prevalence of
unsolicited, automated telephone calls to residential phone users to protect
13. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring prior express consent). See
generally Reyes v. Lincoln Auto. Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that
because Reyes entered into an agreement the consent cannot be unilaterally revoked);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (defining “bargainedfor exchange”).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
15. See id.; In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of
1991, 30 FCC Rcd at 7790. See generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Unsolicited
Calling and Messaging Under Communications Act of 1934, as Amended by Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as Amended, (TCPA) (47 U.S.C.A. § 227) and
Regulations Thereunder (47 C.F.R. § 64.1200) — Federal Cases, 52 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art.
1 (2021) (stating that Congress’s purpose in enacting the TCPA was to restrict
“proliferation of unsolicited phone calls” to residential phone numbers to protect phone
number owners’ privacy).
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those users’ privacy interests.16 While the TCPA requires consumers to give
consent to receive automated calls, it fails to address revocation of consent.17
Nevertheless, by applying common law consent principles, the FCC and
courts interpret the TCPA to allow revocation when consent is freely given.18
However, questions arise when applying this standard to reassigned phone
numbers.
A. The TCPA’s Purpose and the Role of the FCC
When Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991, the country was experiencing
a massive increase in the use of telemarketing, with “over 300,000
telemarketing solicitors call[ing] more than 18 million Americans every
day.”19 At the time of enactment, caller ID was not common, so recipients
could not identify the caller, whether it be a telemarketer, a family member,
or a friend, before answering.20 Companies utilized autodialers to telemarket
because they were more efficient than having a human make the same calls.21
Referring to the unrestricted telemarketing phenomenon as “an intrusive
invasion of privacy,” Congress noted that consumers were “outraged” over
the increase in these “nuisance calls” when it enacted the TCPA.22
One of the TCPA’s primary purposes is to prohibit the use of autodialers
to call phone numbers without the phone number owner’s prior express
consent.23 To achieve this goal, Congress tasked the FCC with issuing

16. See 47 U.S.C. § 227; see also Winbush, supra note 15.
17. See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
18. See Medley v. Dish Network, LLC, 958 F.3d 1063, 1069–70 (11th Cir. 2020)

(holding that Congress intended common law consent to apply to TCPA; therefore,
consent is only freely revocable when it is not given as part of a bargained-for exchange);
In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd.
7961, 7993–94 (2015) (failing to find any proof Congress intended special consent
principles to apply to TCPA).
19. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
137 CONG. REC. S16,971 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Larry Pressler)).
20. Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private
Speech: First Amendment Lessons from the FCC’s TCPA Rules, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
2 (2018).
21. See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1043 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-317 at 6, 10 (1991))
(finding that an autodialer could call and deliver the exact same message to 1,000
telephone numbers without the cost and time of having a human do the same).
22. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105 Stat.
2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
23. Hurwitz, supra note 20, at 2. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) ( “The term
‘automatic telephone dialing system’ means equipment which has the capacity — (A) to
store to produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number
generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”).
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regulations interpreting and applying the statute.24 However, the FCC’s
regulations are subject to judicial review, and a court may set aside or
suspend orders or regulations that the FCC issues.25 Since the TCPA’s
enactment, the FCC has issued several major regulations to aid in
enforcement.26 Most notably, the FCC further broadened the TCPA in 2015
to address new trends that did not exist when Congress implemented the Act,
such as increased cellphone usage and the reassignment of phone numbers.27
i. Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)’s Consent Requirement and Evolution
The TCPA’s consent requirement laid out in § 227(b)(1) makes it
unlawful to make a call within the United States using “any automatic
telephone dialing system . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . .
cellular telephone service . . . .”28 However, the FCC allows autodialed calls
when the phone number’s owner has given his prior express consent to be
called.29 While the TCPA does not expressly define “prior express consent,”
the FCC interprets it to mean that “persons who knowingly release their
phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or permission to be called
at the number which they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.”30
Courts further interpret both the TCPA’s consent subsection and the
FCC’s orders.31 In examining when a phone number owner gives prior
express consent, the Ninth Circuit held that knowingly releasing a phone

24. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (giving the FCC power to “prescribe regulations to
implement the requirements of this subsection” and guidance on what these regulations
may entail, make exceptions for, and ban).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).
26. See generally Marissa A. Potts, Note, “Hello, it’s me [Please don’t sue me!]”:
Examining the FCC’s Overbroad Calling Regulations Under the TCPA, 82 BROOK. L.
REV. 281 (2016) (summarizing the FCC’s orders interpreting and administering the
TCPA).
27. Id. at 291 (citing In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot.
Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7989–8000 (2015)).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (excepting calls made to collect debt owed to the United
States and for emergencies). Contra Barr v. Am. Ass’n Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct.
2335, 2346–48 (2020) (holding the government-debt exception unconstitutional and
severing it from the rest of the statute).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A); In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel.
Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, 8768–69 (1992).
30. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC
Rcd. at 8769.
31. See Zachary D. Miller & Rachel R. Friedman, TCPA Litigation Update: Courts
Take the Reins in Defining the Statute’s Limits, 73 BUS. LAW. 431, 434 (2018) (stating
that courts take a “common sense approach” to the scope of “prior express consent” in
finding that the consent only applies to matters “relate[d] to the context in which consent”
was originally given).
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number for a transaction-related communication meets the prior express
consent requirement established by the FCC.32 For the automated call to be
lawful, the prior express consent must relate to the same subject matter as
the call or text.33 The phone number owner is essentially giving consent to
be contacted only for “use in normal business communications.”34
B. Revocation of Consent Under the TCPA
The TCPA does not address the revocation of consent; however, in its
2015 Order, the FCC interpreted the TCPA to allow revocation through “any
reasonable means.”35 The FCC noted that any other interpretation of the
TCPA could subject consumers to an unlimited number of unwanted calls,
contradicting the TCPA’s purpose and consent as defined by common law.36
To further support this interpretation, the FCC argued that Congress’s failure
to craft a limited form of consent revocation into the TCPA indicates that it
intended for common law consent concepts to apply.37 The FCC concluded
that revocation does not place an unreasonable burden on callers to record
and respect the consent revocation, and included examples of reasonable
revocation methods.38 In the same order acknowledging the permissibility
of consent revocation, the FCC affirmed that the caller has the burden of
proving it had the required prior express consent in the face of a dispute.39

32. See Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1044–45 (9th Cir.
2017).
33. See id. (interpreting the FCC’s 1992 Order alongside Congress’s intent and the
TCPA’s legislative history to mean that giving the phone number does not give express
consent to be contacted for any purpose, but rather the contact must relate to the
transaction that gave rise to consent).
34. See id. at 1045 (using an example from the FCC’s 2008 Order in which the FCC
ruled that giving a cellphone number to the debtor only reasonably gives prior express
consent to be contacted about the debt).
35. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7993–95 (2015) (finding that this interpretation is most reasonable
considering the TCPA’s purpose and stating that the statutory silence on the right to
revoke should be interpreted to favor consumers).
36. See id. at 7993–94.
37. Id. at 7994 (noting that “nothing in the language of the TCPA or its legislative
history support the notion that Congress intended to override a consumer’s common law
right to revoke consent”).
38. See id. at 7996 (listing examples of revocation methods: “a consumer-initiated
call, directly in response to a call initiated or made by the caller, or at an in-store bill
payment location, among other possibilities” and stating that callers cannot hinder “a
consumer’s right to revoke consent using any reasonable method”).
39. Id. at 7994 (emphasizing that under “longstanding Commission precedent,” the
caller bears the burden of proving consent, regardless of how the consent was originally
given).
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In 2018, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the permissibility of the
FCC’s interpretation that consent is revocable through “any reasonable
means.”40 The court refused to agree with concerns that this standard is too
broad, stating that strictly and narrowly defined revocation standards would
harm both the caller and the phone number owner.41 The D.C. Circuit also
noted that the 2015 Order did not affect contracting parties’ ability to
contractually determine revocation procedures for themselves.42
Courts also hold that phone number owners may revoke consent under the
TCPA, reasoning that Congress did not create a specific understanding of
consent within the TCPA, and as a result, common law principles allow the
revocation of consent.43 The Supreme Court held that when Congress uses
a term that has a “settled meaning . . . under the common law,” unless it
expressly provides otherwise, it intended to apply the term’s settled
meaning.44 Under this rule of statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit
considered the TCPA’s purpose and the FCC’s interpretations of the law to
find that Congress intended to allow consumer revocation of consent.45 In
further clarifying and establishing the process for revoking consent, the court
held that a caller must clearly and expressly convey their revocation.46

40. ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (upholding the FCC’s
interpretation of the TCPA, which allows a person to “revoke consent through any
reasonable means clearly expressing a desire to receive no further calls or texts”).
41. See id. at 709–10 (finding that phone number owners should be able to easily
revoke consent to remain consistent with the TCPA’s purpose of protecting citizens from
unwanted automated calls and callers should want easily applied opt-out procedures to
avoid possible TCPA liability).
42. See id. at 710 (stating that the 2015 Order only prevents callers from unilaterally
determining revocation procedures and imposing those on the called party).
43. See, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2017) (supporting this interpretation by finding that under common law consent is
revocable); see also Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999)) (stating that Congress did not
establish another meaning of consent so the common law understanding should be
applied, under which consent that is freely given is revocable)
44. See id.; see also Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2014) (finding that Congress intended for the TCPA to incorporate common law
consent principles, including revocation, under which consent may usually be revoked
orally).
45. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1047 (referring to the TCPA as a “remedial statute
intended to protect consumers from unwanted telephone calls” and noting that the FCC’s
“endorse[ment]” of this interpretation supports the court’s conclusion that consent is
revocable under the TCPA); see also Gager, 727 F.3d at 271 (stating that as a consumer
“remedial statute,” any silence or ambiguity in the TCPA should be permissibly
interpreted in favor of the consumer).
46. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1048.
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Additionally, other courts have found that no time limit applies to when the
phone number owner must revoke consent.47
i. Revocation of Consent in a Bargained-for Exchange
While courts have generally reached a unanimous consensus that freely
given consent may be revoked under the TCPA, they vary when consumers
give consent as part of a bargained-for exchange.48 A bargained-for
exchange, is “[a contractual] agreement to exchange promises or to exchange
a promise for performance or to exchange performances.”49 Under black
letter contract law, a party cannot unilaterally modify an agreement once it
is completed without the other party’s consent.50
In Medley v. Dish Network, LLC,51 the phone number owner expressly
consented to be called as part of her agreement with her television provider
and later attempted to unilaterally revoke this consent, but the television
provider still contacted her.52 The Eleventh Circuit held that an agreement
manifests the parties’ mutual assent, and under contract common law, one
party cannot change the agreement without the other party’s consent to the
change.53 To square this holding with its previous holding in Osorio v. State

47. See, e.g., Gager, 727 F.3d at 272 (concluding that the TCPA’s silence on
temporal limits to give or revoke consent does not limit the consumer’s right to give or
revoke consent).
48. See generally Medley v. Dish Network, LLC, 958 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that consent may not be revoked under the TCPA when it is given as part of a
contract); Reyes v. Lincoln Auto. Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that
the TCPA does not allow unilateral revocation of consent when the consent is given as
part of a bargained-for contract). But see Miller et al., supra note 4, at 462–66
(acknowledging some courts that refuse to follow the Reyes analysis, but who instead
apply the broader Gager and Osorio analyses and focus on the broad intent of the TCPA
to hold that there should be a special consent standard for the revocation of consent in a
bargained-for exchange under the TCPA).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
50. See 13 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 67.8 (2020) (stating that when there is a
contractual obligation, the release of that obligation must be shown by “mutual
agreement” or some other contract right of release); see also Kasia Solon Cristobal, From
Law in Blackletter to “Blackletter Law”, 108 L. LIBR. J. 181, 182 (2016) (quoting THE
WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 1547 (desk ed. 2012)) (defining black
letter law as “basic principles of a subject in the law”).
51. 958 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2020).
52. Id. at 1064–66, 1069.
53. See id. at 1069–70 (citing Kuhne v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 745 F.3d 1091, 1096
(11th Cir. 2014)) (stating that an agreement is the “manifestation of mutual assent”
between the parties to the agreement; accordingly, black letter contract law prohibits one
party to an agreement from unilaterally changing the terms of the agreement once the
agreement has been agreed to).
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Farm Bank F.S.B.,54 where it held that consent may be revoked, the court
differentiated between consent given freely under the TCPA and consent
given as part of a bargained-for exchange under the TCPA.55 Further, the
court refused to create a special exception for contractual consent given
under the TCPA even though it characterized the statute as a remedial
consumer protection statute.56 The court relied on its interpretation that
Congress intended common law consent principles to apply to the TCPA,
and therefore, it could not permissibly alter the understanding of consent.57
Similarly, in Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Financial Services,58 the phone
number owner agreed as part of his lease to receive phone calls from the car
dealer about the lease.59 He later attempted to revoke this consent after he
defaulted on his loan.60 The Second Circuit determined that Congress
intended for the term “consent” to have the same meaning under the TCPA
as it does under common law.61 Thus, analyzing the consent under common
law, the court concluded that consent could not be unilaterally revoked under
the TCPA when given as part of a bargained-for exchange.62 The court
concluded that any other result would be inconsistent with the common law
understanding of consent because the other party to this agreement, the car
dealer, did not assent to changing the terms of the contract.63
The Third Circuit weighed in with its support for applying common law
consent principles to TCPA disputes in Gager v. Dell Financial Services.64
54. 746 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2014).
55. Compare id. at 1255 (holding that consent may be orally revoked under the

TCPA), with Medley, 958 F.3d at 1070–71 (holding that consent may not be unilaterally
revoked when it is given as part of a contract).
56. See Medley, 958 F.3d at 1070–71.
57. See id. (stating that when Congress enacted the TCPA, consent was not
unilaterally revocable when part of a contract and there is no proof in the TCPA’s
legislative history that Congress intended consent to have a meaning different from that
of the common law).
58. 861 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2017).
59. Id. at 53–54.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 56–57 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999)) (stating that
unless Congress establishes otherwise, when it uses a term with a “settled meaning under
the common law,” Congress intends for the term to have the meaning it has at common
law).
62. Id. at 57 (establishing that consent is only revocable under common law when it
is freely given; however, when consent is given as a provision of a contract, any
modification must be made with the “mutual assent” of every party to the contract).
63. See id. at 58 (stating that without express legislative intent by Congress to change
the meaning of consent within the TCPA, courts cannot infer that Congress intended a
different meaning).
64. 727 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013).
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In this case, the court rebuffed the caller’s argument that because Congress
explicitly established specific consent standards in other consumer
protection statutes, consent is likewise limited in the TCPA.65 The court held
that Congress’s choice to make specific consent rules in those statutes, but
not in the TCPA, supported the finding that common law consent principles
apply to TCPA consent.66
ii. Revocation of Consent and Reassigned Phone Numbers
There are millions of wireless number reassignments every year.67 A
caller may place a call to a phone number presuming that the phone number’s
owner is unchanged and intending to reach the prior owner who consented
to the call.68 Because automated callers typically do not receive notice of
when an ownership change has occurred, it is difficult for them to ensure that
they still have the proper consent.69 Currently, no established database or
procedures exist for callers to affirm an owner’s prior express consent or that
the owner still holds domain over that phone number.70 However, if
automated callers fail to obtain the requisite consent consumers can recover
up to $1,500 per violation, meaning per call or text.71 These violations can
quickly add up if autodialers are calling reassigned numbers under the good
faith impression that they have consent.72
In a blow to callers, the FCC’s 2015 Order elucidated “that the TCPA
requires the consent not of the intended recipient of the call, but of the current

65. Id. at 270 (pointing to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 1977 amendments,
the CAN-SPAM 2003 amendments, and the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 where
Congress created explicit procedures whereby the consent could be revoked).
66. Id. (concluding that Congress’s choice to craft specific consent rules in other
statutes, but not the TCPA, means that “Congress did not intend to depart from the
common law understanding of consent”).
67. See Dolan et al., supra note 3.
68. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (questioning whether,
under these circumstances, the caller becomes liable under the TCPA for making an
automated call without the requisite prior express consent).
69. See Alysa Z. Hutnik et. al., TCPA Litigation: Key Issues and Considerations,
PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, Westlaw (database updated April 2021) (suggesting this
creates compliance issues for callers and challenges for customer class action
certification).
70. See id. (acknowledging the FCC’s encouragement to businesses that they
implement procedures to stem calls to reassigned phone numbers).
71. See Tanya L. Forsheit & Daniel M. Goldberg, New FCC Rules Affect Companies
that Use Automated Dialing Systems, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2015 at 15, 15 (using the example
that sending 100,000 messages without consent could result in $50 million worth of
liability, regardless of whether the caller intended to make unconsented calls).
72. See id.
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subscriber.”73 The FCC defined a “called party” as “the subscriber, i.e., the
consumer assigned the telephone number dialed and billed for the call.”74
Courts have upheld the FCC’s interpretation, reasoning that a natural reading
of the TCPA justifies this interpretation.75
The FCC attempted to mitigate the high burden that ensuring consent
placed on callers by creating a “one-call safe harbor.”76 Under this safe
harbor, autodialers who call without notice of the phone number’s
reassignment and have reason to believe they still have the necessary consent
may make one call after the phone number’s reassignment without facing
TCPA liability to attempt to clear any ownership ambiguity.77 However,
while the D.C. Circuit agreed with the FCC’s interpretation of “called party,”
it set the agency’s one-call safe harbor rule aside, finding it “arbitrary and
capricious.”78
Continuing its analysis in ACA International v. FCC,79 the D.C. Circuit
analyzed the FCC’s interpretation of “reasonable reliance” on the prior
express consent given by a party.80 The court struggled to understand how
the FCC concluded that one call was enough to end reasonable reliance on
the prior phone number owner’s consent.81 The court reasoned that one call
or text may not be enough to determine whether the phone number has been
reassigned and the consent revoked.82 The court further found that the onecall safe harbor was inconsistent with the TCPA’s statutory scheme,
73. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30
FCC Rcd. 7961, 7999–8000 (2015).
74. Id. at 8000–01 (finding that the term “called party” within the statute means the
phone number’s current owner, not any prior owner that the caller might be intending to
reach).
75. See, e.g., N.L. ex rel. Lemos v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 960 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th
Cir. 2020) (concluding that the caller’s intent to reach a consenting customer does not
preclude TCPA liability when the caller reaches someone else by reading the statute
according to its “ordinary and natural meaning”).
76. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. at 8007–10.
77. See id. (noting that the one call will provide the caller with an additional
opportunity to gain knowledge of the reassignment, but, if the one call does not clear the
ambiguity, the caller will be said to have had constructive knowledge of the
reassignment). Contra ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (setting
aside the one-call exception).
78. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 705–06.
79. 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
80. See id. at 707.
81. See id. (noting that if the call does not give the caller reason to suspect
reassignment, the caller may be justified in making a second call while still under
reasonable reliance of consent).
82. See id.
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questioning how it aligned with the TCPA if the caller became aware of the
reassignment before the one call or if the one call occurred months after
reassignment.83 The court ruled that the FCC failed to reasonably explain its
rationale for deeming that the one-call exception was not arbitrary.84
The ACA International court concluded that setting aside the FCC’s entire
interpretation of reassigned numbers would avoid imposing the strict liability
standard that the FCC intended to avoid.85 Looking to the future, the court
noted that the FCC is working to implement a comprehensive database that
would make it easier for callers to identify reassigned phone numbers.86
C. Permissibility of Applying Common Law to Federal Statutes
Words or phrases used in a federal statute should be interpreted under the
definition that Congress provided in the statute or in the U.S. Code or by
their “accepted meaning in the area of law addressed by the statute.”87
Justice Jackson justified this approach:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art which [have] accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice it presumably knows
and adopts the cluster of ideas . . . . [A]bsence of contrary direction may
be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as [a]
departure . . . .88

This approach aligns with the “Clear Statement Rule,” which requires
Congress to make its intent to give a particular statutory provision an
interpretation different than the traditional legal interpretation with
“unmistakable clarity.”89 As a result, when Congress enacts a law, the
meaning of a term under related common law presumptively applies to the

83. See id. at 707–08 (stating that “reasonable reliance” may become unreasonable
if the call is made months after reassignment or if the caller learns of the reassignment
before calling, and, noting that the traditional understanding of the caller’s burden of
proof is inconsistent with subjecting consumers to unconsented calls).
84. Id. at 708.
85. See id. at 708–09 (noting that if only the one-call exception was set aside, then
callers would be strictly liable for all calls made to a reassigned number without renewed
consent, even if the caller is unaware of the reassignment, which is likely a harsher
penalty than the FCC intended when trying to craft an approach to reassigned numbers).
86. See id. at 709 (indicating the court would find that these further, more developed,
and tailored methods would create a permissible reasonable reliance standard).
87. LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 7 (2014).
88. Id. at 7–8.
89. See id. at 20 n.119 (citing Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 198, 208 (1983))
(referring to Judge Wald’s statement that Congress should “signal [ ] its intention in neon
lights” when it wants to depart from an accepted legal meaning of a term).
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statute’s terms unless Congress clearly states otherwise.90 The Supreme
Court acknowledged and supported interpreting a statutory term under its
“accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law.”91 Thus, both
courts and the FCC must follow these principles when interpreting the
TCPA.
III. APPLYING CONTRACT COMMON LAW TO CONSENT DISPUTES
WITH REASSIGNED PHONE NUMBERS
Where Congress does not explicitly establish a specialized definition of a
statutory term that already has a recognized legal meaning, such as consent,
courts will interpret the term by inferring that Congress intended that term’s
pre-established meaning to apply to the statute.92 In the case of “consent” as
used in the TCPA, Congress did not create a specialized legal meaning, thus
signaling its intent for established common law consent principles to apply.93
As a result, in the case of reassigned phone numbers, common law consent
requires that any prior express consent be terminated upon reassignment
unless a phone number’s new owner gives his prior express consent.
A. Permissibility of Applying Common Law Contracts to
Consent Under the TCPA
When deciding a dispute about consent under the TCPA, courts should
apply the common law definition of consent, defined as a “voluntary yielding
to what another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission
regarding some act or purpose . . . .”94 When interpreting the meaning of
Congress’s choice of the word consent in the TCPA, courts must follow
recognized canons of statutory interpretation to ensure that they are applying
TCPA provisions as Congress intended.95 In choosing to use the term

90. Id. at 20 (requiring Congress to make its intent to change such common law
principles specific).
91. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (holding that when Congress
chooses a term that has “an accumulated settled meaning at common law,” unless
Congress explicitly states otherwise, it means to adopt the common law meaning of the
term and courts should interpret the term in this way).
92. See id.; see also EIG, supra note 87, at 2, 7–8 (stating that courts must interpret
terms of a statute according to their established legal meaning unless Congress makes
clear its intent for another legal meaning to apply).
93. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 21; EIG, supra note 87, at 2, 7–8. See generally 47
U.S.C. § 227 (failing to further define consent beyond “prior express consent”).
94. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
95. See EIG, supra note 87, at 1 (stating that the canons of statutory interpretation
allow Congress to draft legislation knowing how its language and word choice may be
interpreted by the courts in the future).
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“consent,” which has a recognized meaning under common law, without
providing an alternative definition, Congress signaled to the courts that they
must rely on consent’s “accumulated settled meaning.”96
Further, in applying the “Plain Meaning Rule” to consent in the context of
the TCPA, courts must interpret consent by its definition in the statute or by
its accepted meaning at common law unless Congress explicitly makes clear
otherwise.97 If Congress intended for the TCPA’s statutory term of consent
to take on a different or unique meaning from its established legal meaning,
Congress would have done so with “unmistakable clarity.”98 Congress did
not take this action with the term consent in drafting the TCPA; therefore,
courts must interpret the term according to common law principles.99
Within the TCPA, aside from requiring callers to obtain a phone number
owner’s prior express consent, the law does not define how consent may be
given or revoked.100 This further indicates that Congress did not intend to
deviate from the common law understanding of the term.101 As the TCPA’s
implementing agency, the FCC in its 2015 Order, affirmed that Congress’s
failure to establish a specialized consent standard for the TCPA indicated its
approval of courts applying the common law of consent to TCPA disputes.102
Statutory interpretation requires that courts give deference to an
implementing agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute.103 To reach
this conclusion, the FCC considered the TCPA in its entirety, as well as its

96. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 21 (establishing that when Congress is silent regarding a
term with an established legal meaning this choice indicates its intent not to deviate from
that term’s established legal meaning).
97. See EIG, supra note 87, at 2, 7–8 (noting that if the language is plain and
unambiguous this interpretation must be applied and noting that looking to other areas
of the statute is important in discerning this).
98. See id. at 19–20 (presuming Congress has knowledge of related common law
when it enacts a statute and intends for those principles to be applied unless a specific
meaning is otherwise established).
99. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (choosing not to define consent beyond requiring “prior
express consent;” therefore, not clearly signaling Congressional intent to establish a
specialized consent definition).
100. See id.
101. See generally Medley v. Dish Network, LLC, 958 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2020)
(finding no congressional intent to establish a specialized meaning of consent within the
TCPA); Reyes v. Lincoln Auto. Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2017) (agreeing with
the FCC and other courts who have found it appropriate to apply common law consent
to the TCPA).
102. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7994 (2015).
103. See EIG, supra note 87, at 27; see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (giving the FCC the
power to “prescribe regulations implementing the requirements of this subsection”).
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legislative history, and found no indication that Congress intended to craft a
specialized understanding of consent.104
The Third Circuit supports this conclusion by comparing Congress’s
choice not to further expand or limit the concept of consent within the TCPA
with other consumer protection statutes in which Congress did establish a
unique consent standard.105 In Gager, the caller pointed to Congressional
action that established explicit statutory procedures barring unwanted
communications and argued that the TCPA likewise limits consent
revocation.106 The court, however, disagreed and concluded that Congress’s
choice to make specific consent standards in the pointed-to acts, but its
choice not to do the same in the TCPA, meant that “Congress did not intend
to depart from the common law understanding of consent” in crafting the
TCPA.107
For example in its 1977 amendments to the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, Congress created a specific procedure a consumer must follow to revoke
consent.108 Congress crafted similar consent revocation rules in the CANSPAM Act of 2003 and the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005.109 However,
in the TCPA’s regulation of automated calls to wireless numbers, Congress
only requires “the prior express consent of the called party.”110 While the
TCPA does not further define prior express consent, the FCC is satisfied
when a person knowingly gives their phone number without further
instructions not to be contacted on it, reflecting the understanding under

104. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30
FCC Rcd. at 7994.
105. See Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2013).
106. See id. (arguing that the limited consent principles in the amendments to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act in 1977, Congressional amendments to the CAN-SPAM
Act of 2003, and the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 mean consent is also limited under
the TCPA).
107. Id.
108. See id.; see also Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 805(c),
91 Stat. 877 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692c) (requiring the consumer
to “notif[y] the debt collector in writing” of her desire that the debtor no longer contact
her).
109. See Gager, 727 F.3d at 270; see also CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. No. 108-187,
§ 5(3)(A)(i), 117 Stat. 2707 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7704(a)(3)(A)(i)) (establishing that the email message must include a return email that
the recipient can use to send a response email requesting not to be contacted again); Junk
Fax Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 109-21, § 2(d), 119 Stat. 360 (2005) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(E)) (listing the requirements that “a request not to
send future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine” must include
to be effective).
110. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
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common law of when a party has given consent.111 Because Congress did
not create a specialized meaning of the term “consent” in the TCPA, courts
must apply the term’s common law principles in their interpretations.112
i. Interpreting Revocation of Consent into the TCPA
While the TCPA does not address the revocation of consent, the common
law consent rules indicate that revocation must be allowed.113 According to
black letter law, consent is revocable when it is freely given and is only
revocable when given as part of a bargained-for exchange when all parties
to the agreement mutually agree to the revocation.114 The FCC interprets
revocation as permissible under the TCPA, and courts generally agree with
this conclusion.115 The FCC supports its interpretation by returning to
Congress’s choice not to create a specific consent standard for the TCPA and
concluding that it intended for the application of common law consent
rules.116 This interpretation is consistent with the Third Circuit’s holding in
Gager.117 Further, the D.C. Circuit specifically upheld the permissibility of
the FCC’s interpretation that consent can be revoked through any
111. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC
Rcd. 8752, 8769 (1992); see also Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(defining consent as a “voluntary yielding” or “permission regarding some act or
purpose”).
112. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999); 47 U.S.C. § 227(a) (failing to
establish a specialized definition of consent under the TCPA).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (AM. L. INST. 1981) (stating that
at common law, consent is generally revocable).
114. See id. (finding consent revocable when it is freely given); 13 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 67.8 (2020) (stating that release of an obligation as part of a bargained-for
agreement requires “mutual agreement”).
115. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7993, 7994–95 (2015) (finding revocation of consent permissible by
“any reasonable means” and concluding that this interpretation is most consistent with
the TCPA’s overall purpose as any other conclusion could result in consumers receiving
unlimited calls after they no longer wish to); see, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness
Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that under common law and
relevant case law, consent is revocable, sometimes freely and sometimes subject to the
parties meeting certain standards); Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 270–
71 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that TCPA silence on revocation does not automatically
exclude the right, and relying on the TCPA’s status as a consumer remedial statute);
Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1255 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that
Congress intended to incorporate revocation into the TCPA as part of the common law
understanding of consent).
116. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. at 7994.
117. Gager, 727 F.3d at 270 (acknowledging other consumer protection statutes
where Congress explicitly created specialized consent terms and concluding that if
Congress had the same intent for the TCPA, it would have acted similarly but did not).
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“reasonable means,” finding that a broad standard is best for both callers and
consumers.118
Courts’ acceptance of revocation of consent rests primarily on two
reasons: (1) understanding common law consent principles to apply to the
TCPA and (2) following the FCC’s interpretation that revocation is
permissible. First, when Congress enacts a statute and includes a term with
an established legal meaning at common law, that meaning will apply unless
Congress clarifies that it should not.119 Because Congress did not establish
a special meaning of consent in the TCPA, even though other statutes make
clear that Congress knew it could do so, courts must apply the common law
meaning of consent to the statute, which allows revocation.120 Second, as
the agency tasked with interpreting and promulgating further regulations
consistent with the TCPA, courts must give deference to the FCC’s
reasonable interpretation of the law.121 Thus, courts must acknowledge the
FCC’s approval of consent revocation under the TCPA.122 Because of
Congress’s choice not to create a specialized definition of consent for the
TCPA, common law consent principles rule, which allow for revocation of
consent in varying methods depending on the context in which the consent
was obtained.123
B. Affirming the Differing Revocation of Consent Standards Under
the TCPA Depending on the Consent’s Context
To consistently apply the common law meaning of revocation of consent
to the TCPA, courts must acknowledge the differing standards for revoking
consent at common law. While the common law of consent allows
revocation, depending on the circumstances surrounding the consent, a
person may not be able to revoke that consent unilaterally, and the same rules
apply to the TCPA.124 Black letter contract law prevents a party from
118. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 695, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (stating that
“reasonable means” is any clear expression of the desire to no longer be called or texted).
119. See EIG, supra note 87, at 20.
120. See Gager, 727 F.3d at 270–71 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21
(1999)) (concluding that because Congress did not create a specific meaning of consent
for the TCPA, the common law meaning must be applied and acknowledging other
statutes where Congress established a specialized consent revocation procedure).
121. See EIG, supra note 87, at 27.
122. See, e.g., Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2017) (supporting its holding by pointing out that the FCC “endorses” TCPA consent
revocation).
123. See Gager, 727 F.3d at 270–71 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21
(1999)); Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1047.
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (AM. L. INST. 1981) (stating that
when consent is freely given it may be revoked at any time; however, when consent is
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unilaterally modifying the terms of an agreement once the agreement is
finalized.125 For instance, in Reyes, the plaintiff leased a car from the
defendant and assented to a lease term that allowed the lessor to call him
regarding his auto lease.126 The court held that under the common law
understanding of contractual consent, Reyes could not unilaterally revoke
consent because the lessor obtained it as part of a bargained-for agreement,
the lease.127
Conversely, consider if Reyes was only thinking about leasing a car and
signed up for texts from the dealership to hear about specialized lease deals.
In this scenario, because Reyes freely gave his consent, not as part of any
agreement with the dealership, his consent would be freely and unilaterally
revocable under common law consent standards, and therefore, the TCPA.128
The outcomes of these slightly different factual scenarios regarding
automated messages under the TCPA remain consistent with established
common law consent principles.
Understanding that Congress did not intend a different standard or
understanding of consent from the common law, courts should conclude that
when a phone number owner gives consent as part of a bargained-for
exchange, that consent is not unilaterally revocable.129 Some plaintiffs argue
that this interpretation is inconsistent with decisions that find consent
revocable under the TCPA; however, as demonstrated in the Reyes
hypothetical above, there is a distinct difference between the revocation of
consent standards for freely given and bargained-for consents.130 Therefore,
such decisions are not contradictory and are consistent with common law
consent principles because without further explicit guidance from Congress,
courts must fully apply common law consent principles.

given as a term of an agreement, revocation is subject to the laws of contract or the terms
of the agreement).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 287 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(requiring an alteration of the agreement to be manifested by the party wishing a change
and the other party to demonstrate its acceptance of the wished-for alteration).
126. See Reyes v. Lincoln Auto. Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2017).
127. See id. at 57.
128. See id. (stating that consent is only unilaterally revocable when it is freely given).
129. See Medley v. Dish Network, LLC, 958 F.3d 1063, 1070 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that consent cannot be unilaterally revoked under the TCPA when given as part
of a contract).
130. Compare id. at 1070 (differentiating this case from its prior case, Osorio, by
applying common law consent principles to consent given as part of a bargained-for
exchange), with Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1255 (holding
consent to be called freely revocable under the TCPA when the number was given only
as an emergency contact).
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Related conclusions by courts support the application of the different
common law consent revocation standards to TCPA disputes. For example,
the Eleventh Circuit refused to create a special exception for consent given
as part of a bargained-for exchange.131 The court noted that even though the
TCPA is a remedial consumer protection statute, Congress chose not to
amend the common law understanding of consent to make an exception for
the TCPA.132 Further, the D.C. Circuit noted that the FCC’s 2015 Order
allowing consent to be revoked by “any reasonable means” does not affect
the ability of contracting parties to determine specific revocation procedures
for themselves through mutual assent.133
This standard becomes more difficult to apply in the case of a consumer
who gives consent as part of a bargained-for exchange, then later disconnects
that phone number, and the wireless carrier subsequently reassigns the phone
number to a new user where the caller is not aware of this change in
ownership. In the black and white case where a consumer has given consent
to be called as part of a bargained-for exchange, the common law of contracts
does not allow the consumer to revoke this consent unilaterally.134 This is
true even in the context of the TCPA and its purpose as a consumer
protection statute because Congress did not establish a specialized meaning
of consent for TCPA disputes.135

131. See Medley, 958 F.3d at 1070–71 (stating that while the terms of the TCPA
should be read in a light favorable to consumers, courts cannot craft understandings of
these terms that are different from their settled meaning without explicit permission from
Congress).
132. See id. Contra Miller et al., supra note 4, at 462, 465 (pointing out that some
courts refuse to follow the Reyes and Medley standard, which prevents unilateral
revocation of consent when it is given as part of a bargained-for exchange, and instead
choose to allow a special interpretation of consent under the TCPA because of its purpose
as a consumer protection statute, even though this result is contrary to common law
consent rules).
133. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the 2015
Order to only prevent callers from unilaterally establishing revocation procedures). Cf.
Scott J. Hyman et al., Unconscionability and Contractual Consent-to-Call Clauses
Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 73 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 25, 28
(2019) (explaining that in instances where the caller has imposed consent terms in a
consumer contract of adhesion, it may be appropriate for courts to apply contractual
unconscionability principles to allow consumers to revoke consent).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 287 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981).
135. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7994 (2015) (inferring Congress’s failure to establish a specialized
meaning of consent in the TCPA as implicit approval for resolving TCPA disputes under
the common law); EIG, supra note 87, at 19–20 (explaining the “Clear Statement Rule”
in the case of Congress establishing a specialized meaning for a term that already has an
established legal meaning).
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Returning to the facts in Reyes, however, what if Reyes had given consent
to be called regarding his auto-lease as part of the terms of his agreement
with the lessor but then disconnected his phone number, and the lessor
subsequently placed an automated call or text to Reyes’s old phone number,
instead reaching the phone number’s new owner?136 The TCPA fails to
provide a clear answer to whether this triggers TCPA liability. The caller
technically violated the TCPA because it did not have the prior express
consent of the new phone number owner, and the new phone number owner
was not privy to the bargained-for agreement between Reyes and the
lessor.137 This eliminates the stricter revocation of consent standard required
in a bargained-for agreement under common law.138 Although there was no
mutual assent between Reyes and the lessor to release him from the
contractual agreement, the TCPA’s main purpose of protecting consumers
from unconsented automated calls would protect the phone number’s new
owner from being subjected to calls from the lessor.139 Still, it is likely that
the lessor/caller is unaware of the phone number’s reassignment and did not
intend to make an unsolicited automated call.140 Neither the TCPA, FCC
orders, nor court decisions offer a clear answer as to the outcome of this
scenario.
C. Applying Common Law Consent to Callers of
Reassigned Phone Numbers
To remain consistent with the common law consent principles that
Congress intended the TCPA to embody, callers must still be held liable
when making a call to a reassigned phone number. The reassigned phone
number owner has not given prior express consent to be called and was not
privy to any contractual consent that may have arisen as part of an agreement
between the caller and the previous phone number’s owner.141 Furthermore,
136. See generally Reyes v. Lincoln Auto. Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2017)
(summarizing that the consumer gave consent to be contacted regarding his lease as part
of the lease agreement).
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring prior express consent for automated
calls placed to wireless numbers).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (defining
agreement as “a manifestation of mutual assent” between parties); 13 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 67.8 (2020) (stating that release from a contractual obligation can only
occur upon “mutual agreement” of the parties).
139. See Winbush, supra note 15 (noting the Congressional purpose of the TCPA: to
protect consumers from “unsolicited phone calls”).
140. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. at 7994 (stating that even if the caller is unaware of a change in phone
number ownership, it still has the burden of ensuring consent).
141. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (requiring callers to have the prior express consent of the
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the TCPA has long placed the burden of ensuring prior express consent on
the caller.142
However, this standard creates a high burden on callers.143 Callers facing
TCPA liability have attempted to avoid responsibility for placing calls to a
reassigned number by arguing that a “called party” under the TCPA refers to
a call’s intended recipient, not the person they reach.144 However, both the
FCC and courts rejected this argument and upheld the strict liability standard
and caller’s burden of ensuring proper consent.145 To mitigate the potentially
high cost of the strict liability standard, the FCC created a “reasonable
reliance” exception via the one-call safe harbor for callers who place a call
while reasonably relying on the consent given by the previous phone number
owner.146
While a reasonable reliance standard may be acceptable, the FCC’s
attempted mitigation is inconsistent with the TCPA’s primary purpose of
protecting consumers from unconsented automated calls.147 The one-call
safe harbor was too broad because a caller may learn of reassignment before
placing the call and still avoid liability.148 Further, the rule had no temporal
called party for an autodialed call to escape TCPA liability); EIG, supra note 87, at 19–
20 (stating that unless Congress explicitly states or establishes otherwise, it intends for
terms in its statutes to be interpreted in accordance with their traditional legal meaning).
142. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. at 7994 (emphasizing that this standard is consistent with “longstanding
Commission precedent”).
143. See Hutnik et al., supra note 69 (stating that applying liability for lack of consent
is a difficult issue because the caller may not be aware that it no longer has consent and
there is currently no clear set of procedures or database that would allow a caller to easily
carry its burden of ensuring it still has consent); Forsheit & Goldberg, supra note 71, at
15 (employing an example to demonstrate how quickly damages liability can add up for
the entity making calls without consent).
144. See N.L. ex rel. Lemos v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 960 F.3d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir.
2020) (summarizing the defendant’s argument that if the caller did not intend to place an
unconsented call it should not be subject to TCPA liability).
145. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. at 8000–01 (defining “called party” as “the subscriber, i.e., the consumer
assigned the telephone number dialed and billed for the call”); see, e.g., N.L. ex rel.
Lemos, 960 F.3d at 1168–70 (examining other times that the term “called party” is used
in the TCPA and concluding it is meant to refer to the person who receives the call).
146. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. at 8000 (establishing a “one-call safe harbor” for callers who place a call
to a reassigned phone number under “reasonable reliance” that they still have consent
and do not have “actual or constructive knowledge of the reassignment” and allowing
the caller to make one call to the phone number without facing TCPA liability).
147. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 707–08 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding that the
one-call safe harbor method is inconsistent with protecting people from unconsented
calls).
148. See id. (reasoning it is inconsistent with the TCPA’s purpose of prohibiting
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limit, meaning a caller could place a call years after the reassignment of a
phone number when it would no longer be reasonable to rely on the former
owner’s prior express consent.149 In focusing on the one-call safe harbor’s
efficacy, the D.C. Circuit questioned how one call could be enough to end
reasonable reliance, arguing that if the one call did not allow the caller to
become aware of the phone number’s change in ownership, the caller may
be just as justified in placing another call.150
In making the one-call safe harbor rule, the FCC rightfully acknowledged
the heavy burden placed on callers as phone number reassignments continue
to increase in frequency.151 There is currently no established method for a
caller to learn of a number reassignment short of placing the call and reaching
a different party.152 Congress implemented the TCPA to regulate
unconsented automated calls, not prohibit all automated calls.153 Thus, the
FCC’s choice not to enforce a strict liability standard is consistent with the
TCPA; however, the FCC must determine a way to ensure that both the
caller’s and the consumer’s rights under the TCPA are protected in its
approach to crafting guidance for calls placed to reassigned numbers.
Generally, courts signaled their willingness to support the FCC’s
reasonable reliance standard for TCPA liability because as the implementing
agency, the FCC has the power to interpret the TCPA.154 The courts only
disagreed that the one-call safe harbor was an adequate method of
establishing the reasonable reliance standard.155 The D.C. Circuit concluded
that it had to set aside the FCC’s entire interpretation of reassigned numbers
to avoid imposing a harsher penalty than the FCC intended.156 The D.C.
Circuit stated that it would be willing to support a reasonable reliance
standard, so long as the FCC worked to further develop and tailor the

unconsented calls if the caller finds out about the reassignment but may still make one
call to the phone number’s new owner).
149. See id. (wondering if it is truly “reasonable” to rely on consent that was given
many years ago and not since acted upon).
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 3 (emphasizing the high settlements that callers may
have to pay for violating the TCPA).
152. See In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7994 (2015).
153. See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
154. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d 687 at 708–09.
155. See id.
156. See id. (concluding that if only the one-call safe harbor were set aside, the strict
liability standard would effectively be reimposed, which the FCC signaled it did not
support in attempting to create a “reasonable reliance” standard).
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methods by which callers ensured reasonable reliance while still protecting
consumers.157
In 2018, the FCC announced its plans to establish a Reassigned Number
Database to address the increasing phenomena and disputes arising when
reassigned phone numbers receive automated calls.158 As this approach is
consistent with common law consent principles and the TCPA, and the courts
indicated approval of a detailed, reasonable reliance standard and procedure,
the FCC should continue its efforts to establish this database.
IV. SOLVING REASSIGNED NUMBER TCPA CONSENT DISPUTES
WITH THE PROPOSED REASSIGNED NUMBER DATABASE
The Reassigned Number Database would give callers a straightforward
way to ensure they have the proper consent before placing a call and allow
callers to avoid TCPA liability if they place a call to a reassigned number
after reasonably relying on the information from the Database.159 Currently,
there is no established database or set of easily applicable procedures that
callers can use to determine whether a phone number has been reassigned,
thus terminating the prior express consent required by the TCPA.160
Returning to the Reyes hypothetical, if Reyes gave the car lessor consent
to call him as part of the contractual agreement for his car lease and later
disconnected the phone number, and the wireless carrier reassigns that phone
number to John, for example, there is no clear mechanism for the car lessor
to learn of the reassignment. Thus, the car lessor may place a call to the
phone number on the record under the reasonable reliance that the call will
reach Reyes, but instead reach John, who did not consent to the call and was
not a party to Reyes’s bargained-for agreement.
Under the TCPA, the caller has the burden of ensuring it has consent to
call.161 Thus, making the call and reaching John would expose the
lessor/caller to TCPA liability, which could total as much as $1,500 per
call.162 The FCC’s orders do not prohibit parties to such an agreement from
establishing their own consent terms in the agreement, such as requiring

157. See id. at 709.
158. In re Advanced Methods to Target & Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, 33 FCC

Rcd. 12024, 12025 (2018).
159. See id. at 12025, 12043.
160. See Hutnik et al., supra note 69 (demonstrating that there is currently no easily
applicable methodology for callers to carry their burden of establishing prior express
consent when a phone number has been reassigned).
161. In re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30
FCC Rcd. 7961, 7994 (2015).
162. Forsheit & Goldberg, supra note 71, at 15.
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Reyes to inform the car lessor if he changes his phone number.163 However,
as a consumer remedial statute, the provisions should be read as favorably as
possible for Reyes, and courts may interpret such terms as the car lessor
unlawfully attempting to place the burden of knowing consent on the
consumer.164 However, the FCC does not support a strict liability standard
for callers who place a call to a reassigned phone number when they
reasonably rely on prior express consent.165
To square the TCPA’s requirement that callers ensure that they have the
necessary prior express consent with the difficulties that arise in determining
prior express consent for a reassigned phone number, the FCC should
continue to establish the Reassigned Number Database and clarify its
“reasonable reliance” standard.166 The database would create a set of easily
applicable procedures for callers to follow to ensure that they are not
contacting reassigned phone numbers, and hence no longer have the consent
of the phone number’s owner: (1) check the database, and (2) do not contact
the phone numbers that appear in the database as now having a new
unconsenting owner.167
The FCC began to establish this database by requiring telephone and
wireless companies to keep records of phone number disconnection dates, so
it will be functional for callers upon implementation.168 Thus, in the Reyes
163. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 691, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
164. See id. (stating that the 2015 Order does not prevent parties from establishing

consent terms contractually so long as the caller does not unilaterally make the terms);
Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that as a
consumer remedial statute, any silence or ambiguity in the statute should be permissibly
interpreted in favor of the consumer); see also Hyman et al., supra note 133, at 28
(finding that in the case of contractual consent, unconscionability principles may be able
to be applied to allow the consumer to unilaterally revoke consent).
165. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 708–09 (stating that imposing a strict liability standard
is likely a harsher penalty than the FCC intended when trying to solve consent issues
with reassigned numbers and supporting this conclusion by pointing to the FCC’s
attempted one-call safe harbor).
166. See generally In re Advanced Methods to Target & Eliminate Unlawful
Robocalls, 33 FCC Rcd. 12024 (2018) (proposing a database in which wireless carriers
would be required to keep track of and report numbers that have been reassigned, these
numbers would be uploaded to the database, and callers would have to check the database
to ensure numbers on their call lists do not appear on the reassigned numbers list).
167. See id.
168. FCC Creates Reassigned Phone Number Database with Safe-Harbor Against
TCPA Liability for Users, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP: PRIVACY & SECURITY LAW
BLOG (July 9, 2020), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy--security-law-blog/2020/
07/fcc-tcpa-safe-harbor-reassigned-number-database (stating that when the database
goes live, disconnections will be reported every month and carriers must wait forty-five
days or more before reassigning the number to allow callers time to check the database
and remove the number from the call campaign before it is reassigned).
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hypothetical, when Reyes disconnects his number, the carrier would report
this discontinuation to the FCC’s database and be required to wait at least
forty-five days before reassigning the phone number to John.169 This
procedure allows the car lessor time to check the database and remove the
number from its call campaigns. This accomplishes Congress’s goal of
preventing John from being subjected to unconsented automated calls and
the FCC’s attempt to lessen the heavy strict liability burden on callers. The
proposal would also create a new safe harbor for callers under which the
caller would avoid TCPA liability if it consults the database and does not
find the number.170 This exception remains consistent with the FCC’s
reasonable reliance standard, the TCPA’s overall purpose, Congress’s
intention for common law consent principles to apply to the TCPA, and the
FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.171
V. CONCLUSION
Applying common law consent principles as Congress intended, when a
consumer who gave consent as part of a bargained-for exchange later
disconnects that phone number, and the wireless carrier reassigns that phone
number to an unconsenting, non-party to the bargained-for agreement, the
caller lacks the required prior express consent to make the call. The caller
remains liable for any calls placed to the reassigned phone number even if it
is unaware of the reassignment. To resolve this issue, the FCC should
implement its Reassigned Number Database and clarify the “reasonable
reliance” standard.

169. See id.
170. See id. (stating that the caller must be able to prove that it looked at the database

as well as that it could still reasonably rely on the prior express consent of the prior phone
number owner).
171. See 47 U.S.C. § 227; ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 708–09 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(noting that the FCC does not seem to support a strict liability standard); In re Rules &
Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7994
(2015).

